The concept of direct computation used by Statman (1977) was instrumental in the development of a notion of normal form for proofs of equality. In order to find a functional (Curry-Howard style) interpretation of direct computations we take a closer look at proof procedures for first-order sentences with equality drawing the attention to the need for introducing (function) symbols for rewrites. This leads us to a proposal to the effect that the framework of labelled natural deduction gives the right tools to formulate a proof theory for the "logical connective" of propositional equality in the style of the so-called Curry-Howard interpretation. The basic idea is that when analysing an equality sentence into (i) proof conditions (introduction) and (ii) immediate consequences (elimination), it becomes clear that we need to bring in identifiers (i.e. function symbols) for sequences of rewrites, and this is what we claim is the missing entity in P. Martin-Löf's equality types (both intensional and extensional). For the proof system for equality we establish a normalisation procedure, proving that it is terminating and confluent. a a Part of this material was presented in June 2006 at the Logical Methods in the Humanities Seminar , Stanford University, and the authors would like to thank Solomon Feferman and Grigori Mints for their comments and suggestions. The main results were produced while the first author was Edward Larocque Tinker Visiting Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Stanford Univ, and the second author was a Visiting Scholar at CSLI, Stanford.
Introduction
The clarification of the notion of normal form for equality reasoning took an important step with the work of Statman in the late 1970's [35, 36] . The concept of direct computation was instrumental in the development of Statman's approach. By way of motivation, let us take a simple example from the λ-calculus. There is at least one sequence of conversions from the initial term to the final term.
(In this case we have given three!) Thus, in the formal theory of λ-calculus, the term (λx.(λy.yx)(λw.zw))v is declared to be equal to zv. Now, some natural questions arise:
(i) Are the sequences themselves normal ?
(ii) Are there non-normal sequences?
(iii) If yes, how are the latter to be identified and (possibly) normalized?
(iv) What happens if general rules of equality are involved?
Of course, if one considers only the β-contractions, the traditional choice is for the so-called leftmost reduction [8] .
Nevertheless, we are interested in an approach to these questions that would be applicable both to λ-calculus and to proofs in Gentzen's style Natural Deduction. As rightly pointed out by Le Chenadec in [5] , the notion of normal proof has been somewhat neglected by the systems of equational logic: "In proof-theory, since the original work of Gentzen (1969) on sequent calculus, much work has been devoted to the normalization process of various logics, Prawitz (1965) , Girard (1988) . Such an analysis was lacking in equational logic (the only exceptions we are aware of are Statman (1977) , Kreisel and Tait (1961) )." The works of Statman [35, 36] and Le Chenadec [5] represent significant attempts to fill this gap. Statman studies proof transformations for the equational calculus E of Kreisel-Tait [11] . Le Chenadec defines an equational proof system (the LE system) and gives a normalization procedure.
What is a proof of an equality statement?
The so-called Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov Interpretation defines logical connectives by taking proof, rather than truth-values, as a primitive notion: a function that turns an element a into a proof of P (a) ∃x D .P (x) a n e l e m e n t a (witness) and a proof of P (a)
Based on the Curry-Howard functional interpretation of logical connectives, one can formulate the BHK-interpretation in formal terms as following: , a)' is framed so as to formalise the notion of a function carrying its own argument [30] .) A question remains, however:
What is a proof of an equality statement?
An answer to such a question will help us extend the BHK-interpretation with an explanation of what is a proof of an equality statement:
a proof of the proposition: is given by:
(Perhaps a sequence of rewrites starting from t 1 and ending in t 2 ?)
Two related questions naturally arise:
(i) What is the logical status of the symbol "="?
(ii) What would be a canonical/direct proof of t 1 = t 2 ?
In a previous work [34] we have tried to show how the framework of labelled natural deduction can help us formulate a proof theory for the "logical connective" of propositional equality. 1 The connective is meant to be used in reasoning about equality between referents (i.e. the objects of the functional calculus), as well as with a general notion of substitution which is needed for the characterization of the so-called term declaration logics [2] .
In order to account for the distinction between the equalities that are:
definitional , i.e. those equalities that are given as rewrite rules (equations), orelse originate from general functional principles (e.g. β, η, etc.), and those that are:
propositional , i.e. the equalities that are supported (or otherwise) by an evidence (a composition of rewrites), we need to provide for an equality sign as a symbol for rewrite (i.e. as part of the functional calculus on the labels), and an equality sign as a symbol for a relation between referents (i.e. as part of the logical calculus on the formulas).
Definitional equalities.
Let us recall from the theory of λ-calculus, that:
, (Def. 6.2 and Notation 7.1)] The formal theory of λβη equality has the following axioms:
and the following inference rules:
Propositional equality. Again, let us recall from the theory of λ-calculus, that: Definition 1.37 (β-equality) [8] We say that P is β-equal or β-convertible to Q (notation P = β Q) iff Q can be obtained from P by a finite (perhaps empty) series of β-contractions and reversed β-contractions and changes of bound variables. That is, P = β Q iff there exist P 0 , . . . , P n (n ≥ 0) such that
NB: equality with an existential force.
The same happens with λβη-equality: Definition 7.5 (λβη-equality) [8] The equality-relation determined by the theory λβη is called = βη ; that is, we define
Note again that two terms are λβη-equal if there exists a proof of their equality in the theory of λβη-equality.
Remark 1.2
In setting up a set of Gentzen's ND-style rules for equality we need to account for: 1. definitional versus propositional equality; 2. there may be more than one normal proof of a certain equality statement; 3. given a (possibly non-normal) proof, the process of bringing it to a normal form should be finite and confluent.
The missing entity.
Within the framework of the functional interpretation (à la Curry-Howard [10] ), the definitional equality is often considered by reference to a judgement of the form:
which says that a and b are equal elements from domain D. Notice that the 'reason' why they are equal does not play any part in the judgement. This aspect of 'forgetting contextual information' is, one might say, the first step towards 'extensionality' of equality, for whenever one wants to introduce intensionality into a logical system one invariably needs to introduce information of a 'contextual' nature, such as, where the identification of two terms (i.e. equation) comes from.
We feel that a first step towards finding an alternative formulation of the proof theory for propositional equality which takes care of the intensional aspect is to allow the 'reason' for the equality to play a more significant part in the form of judgement. We also believe that from the point of view of the logical calculus, if there is a 'reason' for two expressions to be considered equal, the proposition asserting their equality will be true, regardless of what particular composition of rewrites (definitional equalities) amounts to the evidence in support of the proposition concerned. Given these general guidelines, we shall provide what may be seen as a middle ground solution between the intensional [13, 12] and the extensional [14] accounts of Martin-Löf's propositional equality. The intensionality is taken care by the functional calculus on the labels, while the extensionality is catered by the logical calculus on the formulas. In order to account for the intensionality in the labels, we shall make the composition of rewrites (definitional equalities) appear as indexes of the equality sign in the judgement with a variable denoting a sequence of equality identifiers (we have seen that in the Curry-Howard functional interpretation there are at least four 'natural' equality identifiers: β, η, ξ and μ). So, instead of the form above, we shall have the following pattern for the equality judgement:
where 's' is meant to be a sequence of equality identifiers.
In the sequel we shall be discussing in some detail the need to identify the kind of definitional equality, as well as the need to have a logical connective of 'propositional equality' in order to be able to reason about the functional objects (those to the left hand side of the ':' sign).
Term rewriting.
Deductive systems based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism [10] have an interesting feature: normalization and strong normalization (Church-Rosser property) theorems can be proved by reductions on the terms of the functional calculus. Exploring this important characteristic, we have proved these theorems for the Labelled Natural Deduction -LND [32, 33] via a term rewriting system constructed from the LND-terms of the functional calculus [19] . Applying this same technique to the LND equational fragment, we obtain the normalization theorems for the equational logic of the Labelled Natural Deduction System [18, 20, 21] .
This technique is used given the possibility of defining two measures of redundancy for the LND system that can be dealt with in the object level: the terms on the functional calculus and the rewrite reason (composition of rewrites), the latter being indexes of the equations in the LND equational fragment.
In the LND equational logic [29] , the equations have the following pattern:
where one is to read: a is equal to b because of 's' ('s' being the rewrite reason); 's' is a term denoting a sequence of equality identifiers (β, η, α, etc.), i.e. a composition of rewrites. In other words, 's' is the computational path from a to b. In this way, the rewrite reason (reason, for short) represents an orthogonal measure of redundancy for the LND, which makes the LND equational fragment an "enriched" system of equational logic. Unlike the traditional equational logic systems, in LND equational fragment there is a gain in local control by the use of reason. All the proof steps are recorded in the composition of rewrites (reasons). Thus, consulting the reasons, one should be able to see whether the proof has the normal form. We have then used this powerful mechanism of controlling proofs to present a precise normalization procedure for the LND equational fragment. Since the reasons can be dealt with in the object level, we can employ a computational method to prove the normalization theorems: we built a term rewriting system based on an algebraic calculus on the "rewrite reasons", which compute normal proofs. With this we believe we are making a step towards filling a gap in the literature on equational logic and on proof theory (natural deduction).
Kreisel-Tait's system.
In [11] Kreisel and Tait define the system E for equality reasoning as consisting of axioms of the form t = t, and the following rules of inference:
where t and u are terms, '0' is the first natural number (zero), 's(-)' is the successor function.
Statman's normal form theorem.
In order to prove the normalization results for the calculus E Statman defines two subsets of E: (i) a natural deduction based calculus for equality reasoning NE; (ii) a sequent style calculus SE.
The NE calculus is defined as having axioms of the form a = a, and the rule of substituting equals for equals:
where E is any set of equations, and a ≈ b is ambiguously a = b and b = a. Statman arrives at various important results on normal forms and bounds for proof search in NE. In this case, however, a rather different notion of normal form is being used: the 'cuts' do not arise out of an inversion principle, as it is the case for the logical connectives, but rather from a certain form of sequence of equations which Statman calls computation, and whose normal form is called direct computation.
With the formulation of a proof theory for the 'logical connective' of propositional equality we wish to analyse equality reasoning into its basic components: rewrites, on the one hand, and statements about the existence of rewrites, on the other hand. This type of analysis came to the surface in the context of constructive type theory and the Curry-Howard functional interpretation.
Martin-Löf 's Equality type.
There has been essentially two approaches to the problem of characterizing a proof theory for propositional equality, both of which originate in P. Martin-Löf's work on Intuitionistic Type Theory: the intensional [13] and the extensional [14] formulations.
The extensional version.
In his [14] and [15] presentations of Intuitionistic Type Theory P. Martin-Löf defines the type of extensional propositional equality 'I' (here called 'I ext ') as:
Note that the above account of propositional equality does not 'keep track of all proof steps': both in the I ext -introduction and in the I ext -elimination rules there is a considerable loss of information concerning the deduction steps. While in the I ext -introduction rule the 'a' and the 'b' do not appear in the 'trace' (the label/term alongside the logical formula), the latter containing only the canonical element 'r', in the rule of I ext -elimination all the trace that might be recorded in the label 'c' simply disappears from label of the conclusion. If by 'intensionality' we understand a feature of a logical system which identifies as paramount the concern with issues of context and provability, then it is quite clear that any logical system containing I ext -type can hardly be said to be 'intensional': as we have said above, neither its introduction rule nor its elimination rule carry the necessary contextual information from the premise to the conclusion.
And, indeed, the well-known statement of the extensionality of functions can be proved as a theorem of a logical system containing the I ext -type such as MartinLöf's Intuitionistic Type Theory [15] . The statement says that if two functions return the same value in their common codomain when applied to each argument of their common domain (i.e. if they are equal pointwise), then they are said to be (extensionally) equal. Now, we can construct a derivation of the statement written in the formal language as:
by using the rules of proof given for the I ext , assuming we have the rules of proof given for the implication and the universal quantifier. 2 The set of rules given in [14] contained the additional elimination rule:
which may be seen as reminiscent of the previous intensional account of propositional equality [13] .
The intensional version.
Another version of the propositional equality, which has its origins in MartinLöf's early accounts of Intuitionistic Type Theory [12, 13] , and is apparently in the most recent, as yet unpublished, versions of type theory, is defined in [37] and [17] . In a section dedicated to the intensional vs. extensional debate, [37] (p.633) says that:
"Martin-Löf has returned to an intensional point of view, as in , that is to say, t = t ∈ A is understood as "t and t are definitionally equal". As a consequence the rules for identity types have to be adapted."
If we try to combine the existing accounts of the intensional equality type 'I' [13, 37, 17] , here denoted 'I int ', the rules will look like: I int -equality
With slight differences in notation, the 'adapted' rules for identity type given in [37] and [17] resembles the one given in [13] . It is called intensional equality because there remains no direct connection between judgements like 'a = b : D' and 's :
A labelled proof theory for propositional equality. Now, it seems that an alternative formulation of propositional equality within the functional interpretation, which will be a little more elaborate than the extensional I ext -type, and simpler than the intensional I int -type, could prove more convenient from the point of view of the 'logical interpretation'. It seems that whereas in the former we have a considerable loss of information in the I ext -elimination, in the latter we have an I int -elimination too heavily loaded with (perhaps unnecessary) information. If, on the one hand, there is an over explicitation of information in I int , on the other hand, in I ext we have a case of under explicitation. With the formulation of a proof theory for equality via labelled natural deduction we wish to find a middle ground solution between those two extremes.
Labelled deduction
The functional interpretation of logical connectives via deductive systems which use some sort of labelling mechanism [15, 6, 7] can be seen as the basis for a general framework characterizing logics via a clear separation between a functional calculus on the labels, i.e. the referents (names of individuals, expressions denoting the record of proof steps used to arrive at a certain formula, names of 'worlds', etc.) and a logical calculus on the formulas. The key idea is to make these two dimensions as harmonious as possible, i.e. that the functional calculus on the labels matches the logical calculus on the formulas at least in the sense that to every abstraction on the variables of the functional calculus there corresponds a discharge of an assumptionformula of the logical calculus. One aspect of such interpretation which stirred much discussion in the literature of the past ten years or so, especially in connection with Intuitionistic Type Theory [15] , was that of whether the logical connective of propositional equality ought to be dealt with 'extensionally' or 'intensionally'. Here we attempt to formulate what appears to be a middle ground solution, in the sense that the intensional aspect is dealt with in the functional calculus on the labels, whereas the extensionality is kept to the logical calculus. We also intend to demonstrate that the connective of propositional equality (cf. Aczel's [1] ' . =') needs to be dealt with in a similar manner to 'Skolem-type' connectives (such as disjunction and existential quantification), where notions like hiding, choice and dependent variables play crucial rôles.
Identifiers for (compositions of ) equalities
In the functional interpretation, where a functional calculus on the labels go hand in hand with a logical calculus on the formulas, we have a classification of equalities, whose identifications are carried along as part of the deduction: either β-, η-, ξ-, μ-or α-equality will have been part of an expression labelling a formula containing ' . ='. There one finds the key to the idea of 'hiding' in the introduction rule, and opening local (Skolem-type) assumptions in the elimination rule. (Recall that in the case of disjunction we also have alternatives: either into the left disjunct, or into the right disjunct.) So, we believe that it is not unreasonable to start off the formalization of propositional equality with the parallel to the disjunction and existential cases in mind. Only, the witness of the type of propositional equality are not the 'a's and 'b's of 'a = b : D', but the actual (sequence of) equalities (β-, η-, ξ-, α-) that might have been used to arrive at the judgement 'a = s b : D' (meaning 'a = b' because of 's'), 's' being a sequence made up of β-, η-, ξ-and/or α-equalities, perhaps with some of the general equality rules of reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity. So, in the introduction rule of the type we need to form the canonical proof as if we were hiding the actual sequence. Also, in the rule of elimination we need to open a new local assumption introducing a new variable denoting a possible sequence as a (Skolem-type) new constant. That is, in order to eliminate the connective ' . =' (i.e. to deduce something from a proposition like ' . = D (a, b) '), we start by choosing a new variable to denote the reason why the two terms are equal: 'let t be an expression (sequence of equalities) justifying the equality between the terms'. If we then arrive at an arbitrary formula 'C' labelled with an expression where the t still occurs free, then we can conclude that the same C can be obtained from the . =-formula regardless of the identity of the chosen t, meaning that the label alongside C in the conclusion will have been abstracted from the free occurrences of t.
Observe that now we are still able to 'keep track' of all proof steps (which does not happen with Martin-Löf's I ext -type) [14, 15] , and we have an easier formulation (as compared with Martin-Löf's I int -type) [13] of how to perform the elimination step.
The proof rules
In formulating the propositional equality connective, which we shall identify by ' . =', we shall keep the pattern of inference rules essentially the same as the one used for the other logical connectives (as in, e.g. [30] ), and we shall provide an alternative presentation of propositional equality as follows:
where '´' is an abstractor which binds the occurrences of the (new) variable 't' introduced with the local assumption '[a = t b : D]' as a kind of 'Skolem'-type constant denoting the (presumed) 'reason' why 'a' was assumed to be equal to 'b'.
(Recall the Skolem-type procedures of introducing new local assumptions in order to allow for the elimination of logical connectives where the notion of 'hiding' is crucial, e.g. disjunction and existential quantifier -in [30] .) Now, having been defined as a 'Skolem'-type connective, ' . =' needs to have a conversion stating the non-interference of the newly opened branch (the local assumption in the . =-elimination rule) with the main branch. Thus, we have:
REWR(e,tw(d(t))) : W provided w does not disturb the existing dependencies in the term e (the main branch), i.e. provided that rule 'r' does not discharge any assumption on which ' . = D (a, b)' depends. The corresponding ζ-equality is:
w(REWR(e,td(t))) = ζ REWR(e,tw(d(t)))
The equality indicates that the operation w can be pushed inside the´-abstraction term, provided that it does not affect the dependencies of the term e. Since we are defining the logical connective ' . =' as a connective which deals with singular terms, where the 'witness' is supposed to be hidden, we shall not be using direct elimination like Martin-Löf's I ext -elimination. Instead, we shall be using the following . =-elimination:
The elimination rule involves the introduction of a new local assumption (and corresponding variable in the functional calculus), namely '[a = t b : D]' (where 't' is the new variable) which is only discharged (and 't' bound) in the conclusion of the rule. The intuitive explanation would be given in the following lines. In order to eliminate the equality . =-connective, where one does not have access to the 'reason' (i.e. a sequence of 'β', 'η', 'ξ' or 'ζ' equalities) why the equality holds because ' . =' is supposed to be a connective dealing with singular terms (as are '∨' and '∃'), in the first step one has to open a new local assumption supposing the equality holds because of, say 't' (a new variable). The new assumption then stands for 'let t be the unknown equality'. If a third (arbitrary) statement can be obtained from this new local assumption via an unspecified number of steps which does not involve any binding of the new variable 't', then one discharges the newly introduced local assumption binding the free occurrences of the new variable in the label alongside the statement obtained, and concludes that that statement is to be labelled by the term 'REWR(e,td(t))' where the new variable (i.e. t) is bound by the '´'-abstractor.
Another feature of the . =-connective which is worth noticing at this stage is the equality under 'ξ' of all its elements (see second introduction rule). This does not mean that the labels serving as evidences for the . =-statement are all identical to a constant (cf. constant 'r' in Martin-Löf's I ext -type), but simply that if two (sequences of) equality are obtained as witnesses of the equality between, say 'a' and 'b' of domain D, then they are taken to be equal under ξ-equality. It would not seem unreasonable to think of the . =-connective of propositional equality as expressing the proposition which, whenever true, indicates that the two elements of the domain concerned are equal under some (unspecified, hidden) composition of definitional equalities. It is as if the proposition points to the existence of a term (witness) which depends on both elements and on the kind of equality judgements used to arrive at its proof. So, in the logical side, one forgets about what was the actual witness. Cf. the existential generalization:
where the actual witness is in fact 'abandoned'. Obviously, as we are interested in keeping track of relevant information introduced by each proof step, in labelled natural deduction system the witness is not abandoned, but is carried over as an unbounded name in the label of the corresponding conclusion formula.
Note, however, that it is carried along only in the functional side, the logical side not keeping any trace of it at all. Now, notice that if the functional calculus on the labels is to match the logical calculus on the formulas, than we must have the resulting label on the left of the ' β ' as β-convertible to the concluding label on the right. So, we must have the convertibility equality:
The same holds for the η-equality:
Parallel to the case of disjunction, where two different constructors distinguish the two alternatives, namely 'inl' and 'inr', we here have any (sequence of) equality identifiers ('β', 'η', 'μ', 'ξ', etc.) as constructors of proofs for the . =-connective. They are meant to denote the alternatives available.
General rules of equality.
Apart from the already mentioned 'constants' (identifiers) which compose the reasons for equality (i.e. the indexes to the equality on the functional calculus), it is reasonable to expect that the following rules are taken for granted: reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity.
Substitution without involving quantifiers.
We know from logic programming, i.e. from the theory of unification, that substitution can take place even when no quantifier is involved. This is justified when, for some reason a certain referent can replace another under some condition for identifying the one with the other. Now, what would be counterpart to such a 'quantifier-less' notion of substitution in a labelled natural deduction system. Without the appropriate means of handling equality (definitional and propositional) we would hardly be capable of finding such a counterpart. Having said all that, let us think of what we ought to do at a certain stage in a proof (deduction) where the following two premises would be at hand:
We have that a and y are equal ('identifiable') under some arbitrary sequence of equalities (rewrites) which we name g. We also have that the predicate formula P (a) is labelled by a certain functional expression f which depends on a. Clearly, if a and y are 'identifiable', we would like to infer that P , being true of a, will also be true of y. So, we shall be happy in inferring (on the logical calculus) the formula P (y). Now, given that we ought to compose the label of the conclusion out of a composition of the labels of the premises, what label should we insert alongside P (y)? Perhaps various good answers could be given here, but we shall choose one which is in line with our 'keeping record of what (relevant) data was used in a deduction'. We have already stated how much importance we attach to names of individuals, names of formula instances, and of course, what kind of deduction was performed (i.e. what kind of connective was introduced or eliminated). In this section we have also insisted on the importance of, not only 'classifying' the equalities, but also having variables for the kinds of equalities that may be used in a deduction. Let us then formulate our rule of 'quantifier-less' substitution as:
which could be explained in words as follows: if a and y are 'identifiable' due to a certain g, and f (a) is the evidence for P (a), then let the composition of g(a, y) (the label for the propositional equality between a and y) with f (a) (the evidence for P (a)) be the evidence for P (y).
By having this extra rule of substitution added to the system of rules of inference, we are able to validate one half of the so-called 'Leibniz's law', namely:
The LND equational fragment.
As we already mentioned, in the LND equational logic, the equations have an index (the reason) which keeps all proof steps. The reasons is defined by the kind of rule used in the proof and the equational axioms (definitional equalities) of the system. The rules are divided into the following classes: (i) general rules; (ii) subterm substitution rule; (iii) ξ-and μ-rules.
Since the LND system is based on the Curry-Howard isomorphism [10] , terms represent proof constructions, thus proof transformations correspond to equalities between terms. In this way, the LND equational logic can deal with equalities between LND proofs. The proofs in the LND equational fragment which deals with equalities between deductions are built from the basic proof transformations for the LND system, given in [32, 30, 33] . These basic proof transformations form an equational system, composed by definitional equalities (β, η and ζ). 
Definition 2.2 (system of equations)
A system of equations S is a set of equations:
where r i is the rewrite reason identifier for the ith equation in S. (ii) the r i 's; using the substitution operations:
and the operations for building new rewrite reasons:
Definition 2.4 (general rules of equality)
The general rules for equality (reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity) are defined as follows:
The "subterm substitution" rule.
Equational logic as usually presented has the following inference rule of substitution: s = t sθ = tθ where θ is a substitution.
Note that the substitution θ "appeared" in the conclusion of the rule. As rightly pointed out by Le Chenadec in [5] , from the view point of the subformula property (objects in the conclusion of some inference should be subobjects of the premises), this rule is unsatisfactory. He then defines two rules:
where M , N and O are terms and the context C[ ] is adopted in order to distinguish subterms.
In [19] we have formulated an inference rule called "subterm substitution" which deals in a explicit way 3 with substitutions. In fact, the LND [32, 33] can be seen as an enriched system which brings to the object language terms, and now substitutions.
Definition 2.5 (subterm substitution)
The rule of "subterm substitution" is framed as follows: The symbols sub L and sub R denote in which side (L -left or R -right) is the premiss that contains the subterm to be substituted.
Note that the transitivity rule previously defined can be seen as a special case for this rule when D = D and the context C is empty.
The ξ-and μ-rules.
In the Curry-Howard "formulae-as-types" interpretation [10] , the ξ-rule 4 states when two canonical elements are equal, and the μ-rule 5 states when two noncanonical elements are equal. So, each introduction rule for the LND system has associated to it a ξ-rule and each elimination rule has a related μ-rule. For instance, the ξ-rule and μ-rule for the connective ∧ are defined as follows:
Term rewriting system for LND with equality.
In [20] we have proved termination and confluence for the rewriting system arising out of the proof rules given for the proposed natural deduction system for equality.
The idea is to analyse all possible occurrences of redundancies in proofs which involve the rules of rewriting, and the most obvious case is the nested application of the rule of symmetry. But there are a number of cases when the application of rewriting rules is redundant, but which is not immediately obvious that there is a redundancy. Take, for instance, the following case: By analysing all cases of redundant proofs in first-order logic with equality we arrive at following set of associated rewriting rules: for sequences of rewrites, and this is what we have claimed should be the missing entity in P. Martin-Löf's equality types, both intensional and extensional. What we end up with is a formulation of what appears to be a middle ground solution to the 'intensional' vs. 'extensional' dichotomy which permeates most of the work on characterising propositional equality in natural deduction style.
Uniqueness of equality proofs.
Although the rewriting system is terminating and confluent, we have observed an interesting phenomenon here: there may be more than a normal proof of an equality statement. This is not a contradiction since the confluence property only says that the term for the equality reason can be brought to a unique normal form regardless of the order in which it is reduced. But there may be a different, yet normal, proof of the same equality statement. What appears to be a similar phenomenon has been identified in a paper by Hoffman and Streicher [9] , which, although in a different context, indicates that there is a need to investigate further what is happening here.
